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Resumen:  Esta contribución presenta como el 
concepto filosófico de “donación” es reinterpre-
tado en la reflexión de Patočka. Partiendo de la 
lección husserliana, gracias a la cual las cosas 
son dadas en la pura inmanencia de la conscien-
cia, él critica esta orientación “subjetivista” por-
que no desarrolla adecuadamente el tema del 
aparecer en el campo fenomenal. La segunda 
sección analiza tres desplazamientos metódicos 
que abarcan: el rol del sujeto, su relación con la 
trascendencia, el darse a sí mismo del mundo en 
su totalidad. La tercera sección compara la re-
flexión de Patočka con dos referencias cruzadas 
a algunos intentos similares en la historia de la 
fenomenología. El tema de “la donación”, por 
tanto, nos traslada al mayor problema con el 
que ha trabajado siempre la filosofía: la mani-
festación del mundo. Patočka intentó esclarecer 
este problema mediante dos metáforas (el es-
pejo y la pintura), pero también subrayó cómo 
concierne el modo en el que el hombre inter-
preta la propia existencia. 
 Abstract: This paper presents how the philo-
sophical key concept of givenness is reinter-
preted in Patočka's reflection. Starting from 
the Husserlian idea, according to which things 
are given in the pure immanence of conscious-
ness, Patočka criticized this "subjectivist" ori-
entation because it doesn’t adequately develop 
the appearing in the phenomenal field. The 
second section analyzes three main methodical 
shifts concerning: the nature and the role of 
the subject, its relationship with the transcend-
ence, the self-giving of the world as a whole. 
The third section compares Patočka's reflection 
and two cross-references to similar undertak-
ing in the history of phenomenology. The 
theme of givenness brings us back in the end 
to the biggest problem within which philosophy 
has always worked: world manifestation. 
Patočka tried to clarify this issue through two 
metaphors (the mirror and the painting), but 
he also highlighted as it concerns the way in 
which man interprets his existence. 
Palabras clave: aparecer, donación, percep-
ción, campo fenomenal.  
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To recognize the key points of Patočka’s position on the notion of givenness, 
it is first necessary to understand the core of his criticism of Husserl. Since Hus-
serl remains at the level of transcendental subjectivity, he does not move beyond 
being, but for Patočka the concept of consciousness, defined by intentionality, is 
unable to account for the appearance of what appears. For Patočka consciousness 
is always positive and cannot be the source from which appearance originates. 
This is why Husserl’s position falls short of giving a full account of givenness: he 
continues to consider the reflective return of the subject to itself as givenness’s 
foundational basis1. But, the subjective aspect of thetic characteristics and of 
characteristics of givenness is as external to the subject as the things that ap-
pear. We are not able to understand how lived-experience could be the origin for 
appearing. In this issue, Husserl’s phenomenology risks renouncing its discover-
ies in the sphere of appearing and its modes of givenness—and deviating into 
subjective construction. Yet for Patočka the aim is quite the opposite: an a-sub-
jective phenomenological account makes possible an opening beyond the ego 
that moves it towards the more fundamental structures underpinning human ex-
perience. 
The core of Patočka’s discussion is therefore of Husserl’s account of inten-
tionality and its basis in a transcendental ego. For Patočka, our access to reality 
is not a purely reflective operation, “as Husserl seems to believe when consider-
ing the original ‘givenness’ of the present thing as guaranteed in the intentionality 
of consciousness. The accessibility of the original datum in the ‘immanent per-
ception’ is a prejudice that must be rejected”2. Rather, according to Patočka we 
target different phenomena depending on whether we find intentionality to be 
the ultimate foundation of experience and appearing or we uphold the idea that 
every experience is bonded to an objective correlate and the concept of 
 
 
1 Instead, according to Patočka, “there is a difference here between those characteristics that I as-
cribe to the ‘thing itself’ and other characteristics, which are certainly also present but not belonging to it, 
but with whose aid, so to speak, or on the basis of which, it appears” J. Patočka, “Der Subjektivismus der 
Husserlschen und die Forderung einer asubjektiven Phänomenologie”, in Id., Die Bewegung der menschli-
chen Existenz, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart, 1991. English Translation: Id, “Husserl's Subjectivism and the Call 
for an Asubjective Phenomenology”, in Ľ. Učník - I. Chvatík - A. Williams (eds.), Asubjective Phenomenol-
ogy: Jan Patočka’s Project in the Broader Context of his Work, Nordhausen, Traugott Bautz, 2015, p. 30. 
The characteristics of givenness appearing in the world before me are not present as lived-experiences, 
or something subjective. “That on the basis of which an object is itself objectively […] present. […] What 
we argue against, however, is the claim that one can make this basis of appearing into yet another object 
for a possible ‘inner perception’ that grasps it ‘originally’ […].” Ibidem, pp. 30-31. 
2 J. Patočka, Die Bewegung der menschlichen Existenz, p. 426. 
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consciousness. “What belongs to the essence of my critique is the fact that I 
cannot embrace the Husserlian interpretation of lived-experience and acts, and 
hence also his concept of the intentionality of consciousness”3. Patočka thus crit-
icizes the self-certainty of the ego as it is interpreted by Husserl: a presence that 
appears as an original self-givenness, which in turn requires a corresponding 
object. Instead, for Patočka the ego cannot be grasped in a reflexive act or an 
internal perception: “I'm not given like an object”4. He believes that only through 
‘cathartic release’ of the phenomenal element can phenomenology regain its 
sense of investigation of appearing as such. This interrogation of the very defini-
tion of phenomenology is similar to Heidegger’s criticism of Husserl regarding the 
problem of the “return to the things themselves”. In fact, Patočka states: “our 
reflection would first of all contribute to a recovery and a renewal of the identifi-
cation motto of phenomenology ‘towards things themselves’. Indeed, our inten-
tion is to start from things just as they appear and they show themselves, to 
stick to showing of things and refraining from all speculation”5. 
 
2. HUSSERL´S POSITION 
 
The concepts of givenness is as central to phenomenology, and as sensitive 
a topic, as it is far from being unequivocally clarified—even by Husserl himself6. 
According to Michel Henry, the core concepts of phenomenology and their found-
ing principles “remain de facto fundamentally indeterminate”7; they open into 
contradictions and reinforce latent tensions. On the other hand, always referring 
to the issue of givenness, Jean Greisch has argued that: “the concept of 
givenness, which is already semantically close to the concept of phenomenon and 
appearance, from the beginning of Husserl's phenomenology represents [...] an 
essentially operative concept”8. It remains certain, however, that Husserl refused 
 
 
3 J. Patočka, Asubjective Phenomenology, p. 32. 
4 J. Patočka, Asubjective Phenomenology, pp. 37-38. 
5 J. Patočka, Die Bewegung der menschlichen Existenz, p. 425. 
6 Givenness is always present whenever the matter is intentionality, reduction, evidence, self-
givenness of consciousness, etc. This because givenness is the necessary background to all the phenom-
enological reflection. This theme is a Brentanian school heritage and, even before Logical Investigations, 
Husserl confronts himself also with Twardowski. However, we suggest these references: The idea of phe-
nomenology (lessons III, IV, V), Ideas I (explicitly § 143), Cartesian Meditations (§§ 24 ss.). 
7 Michel Henry, Phénoménologie de la vie, vol. I: De la Phénoménologie, Paris, PUF, 2003, p. 78. 
Translations from the French and German texts are mine own. 
8 Jean Greisch, Gegebenheit, Husserl-Lexikon, Darmstadt, WBG, 2010, p. 111. 
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the empirical tradition (that accepts data, whereas Husserl does not) precisely 
because he refused the empirical account of perception. Husserl rejects all ‘sen-
sualist’ accounts as a stream of contents ‘without sense in themselves’9. Rather, 
consciousness always involves the intending of objects, sense, and the constitu-
tion method: taking things in their givenness does not mean merely perceiving 
or ordering them clearly in the perceptive process. “Rather, it is necessary to 
‘follow up’ the perceptually meant in a perceiving and exsperiencing, be it actually 
exsperiencing or just phantasizing”10. This not mean that Husserl has renounced 
the world of perception for the abstraction of the ‘eidetic content’11. From this 
perspective, givenness in Husserl is not guided by perception but intuition. Intu-
ition becomes the “principle of all principles”12 to which we must remain faithful. 
It is the measure of all truth and the source of all knowledge. 
Speaking more broadly, givenness for Husserl results from the reduction to 
immanence of consciousness. It’s fundamental to remember Husserl’s distinction 
between transcendental reduction13 and eidetic consideration14. Only transcen-
dental reduction clarifies the notion of givenness, as it entails the reduction of 
transcendental experience to the sphere of ownnness, to the immanence of con-
sciousness. Through transcendental reduction, Husserl interprets the world on 
the basis of the givenness of meaning (Sinngebung) of the transcendental ego. 
This ego constitutes the objective world15. Husserl arrives at this conclusion 
 
 
9 See M. Heidegger, Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, P. Jaeger (ed.), GA vol. 20, 
Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 1979, p. 147; Id., “Über das Prinzip “Zu den Sachen selbst”, Heidegger 
Studies, 11 (1995), pp. 2-7. 
10 Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. 
Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution, Den Haag, M. Nijhoff, 1952. English 
translation: Id., Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philopohy, second 
book: Studies in Phenomenology of Constitution, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989, p. 37. 
11 Within the pure ego Husserl distinguishes immanent perception (in which the subject grasps him-
self absolutely, in its own subjective irreducible core, in its own uneliminable residuum) from transcendent 
perception (an object caught by a subject and never independent of it). Our evidence of transcendent 
perception is always inadequate, never absolute. Matter (yle) constitutes the material moment of the per-
ception of the transcendent object. Husserl emphasises that it belongs to the essence of such objects to 
always reveal themselves in profiles, adumbrations (Abschattungen, see Ideas I § 3), or perspectival 
aspects. The object as a whole is never given; it always presents from one side or perspective. On the 
Husserlian view of perception, see also Thing and Space lectures (§ 40) and the Cartesian Meditations (§ 
9). 
12 See E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. 
Erstes Buch, Den Haag, M. Nijhoff, 1950. English translation: Id., Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenol-
ogy and to a Phenomenological Philopohy, first book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, 
Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1983, p. 44. 
13 See especially Cartesian Meditations § 44. 
14 See especially Ideas I § 3. 
15 Eidetic intuition (Wesensschau), instead, grasps the invariant structures of any given content. Any 
empirical content includes a non-empirical datum. Eidetic seeing (Wesenserschauung) doesn’t give us 
individual objects, but a new sort of object: the pure essences. 
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through Descartes, to whom he owes the intellectual insight that comprehension 
of the cogitatio is itself knowledge. In this sense cogitationes are the first abso-
lute givennesses: “Every intellectual experience, indeed every experience what-
soever, can be made into an object of pure seeing and apprehension while it is 
occuring. And in this act of seeing it is an absolute givenness”16. Husserl’s asser-
tion that “Absolute givenness is an ultimate”17, however, can easily be misun-
derstood, because it seems to imply that absolute, direct givennesses are offered 
up on a platter, just waiting for the gaze of the phenomenologist. In fact, Hus-
serl's intention is to determine the essence of the “material thing” through a 
phenomenological analysis of givenness. To achieve this, “thus we have to go 
back to, as exemplary, to the consciousness in wich things are given to us origi-
narily and so perfectly that we can be lacking nothing for grasping the universal 
essential form which prescribes the apriori rule for such objects”18. Husserl, in 
this way, founds the possibility for understanding givenness in our selves; only 
after a certain point does he distinguish between the noetic-subjective and the 
noematic-objective aspects of cogitationes. 
On this topic Patočka, however, agrees instead with the analysis of Husserl 
made by Ernst Tugendhat19, who argues that this method is not feasible. From 
this perspective, Husserl's “Cartesian” reason is located in precisely this point: 
“[in the] dogmatic prejudice of [the] absolute givenness of cogitationes [...]”20. 
This stance presumes givenness is immanent to consciousness, and therefore 
evident, giving rise to itself21. Patočka instead frames givenness as related to the 
self-giving of Being, to the field of appearing and our modes of understanding 
the relation between the world and our subjectivity22. Indeed, the Czech philos-
opher aims to extend and elaborate the Husserl’s analysis in the Ideas, particu-
larly the work he did before his transcendental phase. Patočka notes that, before 
becoming an object of logical-linguistic research, the field of appearing and the 
 
 
16 E. Husserl, Die Idee der Phänomenologie. Fünf Vorlesungen, Den Haag, M. Nijhoff, 1950. English 
translation: Id., The Idea of Phenomenology, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999, p. 24. 
17 Ibidem, p. 45. 
18 E. Husserl, Ideas, second book, p. 37. 
19 Patočka refers to Ernst Tugendhat, Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger, Berlin, De 
Gruyter, 1967.  
20  J. Patočka, “Der Subjektivismus der Husserlschen und die Möglichkeit einer asubjektiven 
Phänomenologie”, in Id., Die Bewegung der menschlichen Existenz, Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta, 1991, p. 269. 
21 See E. Husserl, Ideas, first book, pp. 343-344. 
22 Generally, Patočka uses the term danost to indicate givenness—a semantically broad and relatively 
indeterminate term. It indicates the given in a broad sense, not in the sense of scientific data. Patočka 
also uses datum, but to refer to scientific data. 
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different ways in which givenness is given within it had already been discovered 
by Husserl in the Logical Investigations: 
 
The real discovery of the Logical Investigations is the field of appearing, which, in order 
that the thing can present itself and appear, must overcome the thing and its material 
structure; it is a field that hides within itself a legality sui generis not convertible into 
that of the object in its own being or [even] into that of the mental being with its 
specifically egological character.23 
 
This reference to the Logical Investigations is important for Patočka. He 
thinks it is here that “we find ourselves facing the nascent subjectivism of Hus-
serl’s phenomenology”24. Indeed, Patočka uses this passage to disagree with 
Husserl’s subjectivist orientation25. The debate on analysis of perception’s acts 
between Husserl and Natorp in Fifth Logical Research (cf. § 14) is interesting to 
consider in relation to Patočka’s reading of this as the anchor point for Husserl’s 
subjectivism. Patočka characterizes this point as a “metaphysical neutrality”. 
From this debate it emerges that, for Husserl, interpretive intention is always 
already a hermeneutics, a surplus animating sensation and allowing us to per-
ceive a precise object. Through this act of apperception (which is always an ob-
jectifying act), it is possible to separate sensations (hyletic data), which are ex-
perienced but do not appear, from objects, which appear but are not experienced. 
Thanks to this split, intention turned toward an intended immanent object can be 
characterized as apprehension, interpretation, or apperception. This is a synthe-
sizing operation. Thus, on one hand, there are acts of apprehension that animate 
sensations (subjective processes that do not appear); on the other, there are 
objects that appear, or “the world”26 in general. According to Patočka, Husserl 
also identified the fact that the object appears in different modes—and, first and 
foremost, appears as itself—with positional characters and with its own 
 
 
23 J. Patočka, Die Bewegung der menschlichen Existenz, p. 274. The discovery of the phenomenal 
sphere by Husserl has great importance because previously the philosophical tradition had always con-
verted it into the structure of what appears in one’s own being. 
24 Ibidem, p. 276. I also refer to the study by Marc Richir, “Possibilité et nécessité de la phénoméno-
logie a-subjective”, in E. Tassin - M. Richir, Jan Patočka: philosophie, phénoménologie, politique, Grenoble, 
Million, 1992, pp. 101-120. 
25 According to Patočka it is possible to trace a more “subjectivist” orientation in Fifth Logic Research, 
chapter II: Consciousness as intentional experience. 
26 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und 
Theorie der Erkenntnis. Erster Teil, Den Haag, M. Nijhoff, 1984. English translation: Id., Logical Investi-
gations. Volume II. London and NewYork, Routledge, 2001, p. 106. 
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modalizations and manner of givenness. Yet despite having tried to locate a way 
in which the phenomenal field could be independent of the sphere of the appear-
ance of being, Husserl never gave up his “idealistic metaphysics of conscious-
ness”27. Such a sacrifice, however, would be required to return to phenomenol-
ogy the sense of appearing as such. Husserl was attentive to the phenomenal 
sphere, but his “intention is circumscribed by terms that come from the subjec-
tive sphere: this not a highlighting of the phenomenal field as such, but its re-
duction to pure immanence”28. In this way, the problem of providing evidence 
for the phenomenal field as such reemerges in the form of the problem of the 
non-inclusion of things in the sphere of lived-experiences. In the next section, 
we will explore in more detail how Patočka analyzes the problem of givenness 
and the methodical displacements he creates on this issue. 
 
3. METHODICAL DISPLACEMENTS 
 
3.1 The role of the ego 
 
For Patočka the problem of givenness also concerns the ego, because to 
grasp what is given, we must increasingly anchor ourselves in our own subjec-
tivity, distinguishing between reflection and phenomena. Reflection, for instance, 
always requires an “object” on which to exercise, whereas the phenomena that 
appear in the phenomenal field are not objective beings. In addition, we have to 
consider that even the I is not objectively given to us. Indeed, “the I is a struc-
tured activity, some moments of which appear as given, which would make no 
sense and could not exist without a non-given nexus”29. In fact, the alleged cer-
tainty of the subject (neccessary to any theory of knowledge) is destablized by 
the lack of clarity of sensory data, which calls into questions the certainty of the 
 
 
27 J. Patočka, Die Bewegung der menschlichen Existenz, p. 282. 
28 Ibidem, p. 279. Patočka says that, when drafting the Logical Investigations, Husserl did “not rec-
ognize the existence of an ‘pure’ ego” (Die Bewegung der menschlichen Existenz, p. 275), which meant 
he could only operate according to a reduction to immanence. 
29  J. Patočka, “Der Subjektivismus der Husserlschen und die Forderung einer asubjektiven 
Phänomenologie”, in Id., Die Bewegung der menschlichen Existenz, Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta, 1991. English 
Translation: Id, “Husserl's Subjectivism and the Call for an Asubjective Phenomenology”, in Ľ. Učník - I. 
Chvatík - A. Williams (eds.), Asubjective Phenomenology: Jan Patočka’s Project in the Broader Context of 
his Work, Nordhausen, Traugott Bautz, 2015, p. 38. Patočka means that the world can be explained as a 
chain of reciprocal references that give meaning to human life too. 
26 MARCO BARCARO 
 
 
26 Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, n. 16, 2019. 
 
subjectivity experiencing them30. Moreover, the structure of appearing as such 
shows that the subject is limited in relation to structure. 
The subject therefore has to be thought otherwise. What then is the role of 
the subject? For Patočka the subjectivity appearing in the field of appearance is 
a character, or component, of the phenomenal field, one of its moments. This 
subjectivity must be understood as that to whom the appearing appears and not 
that on which appearance depends. I am the one to whom phenomenal charac-
ters point. This means that the self understanding of the subject and its under-
standing of things form a unit—but the self-understanding of the subject cannot 
be the base of its understanding of things, nor can its understanding of things be 
the base of its self-understanding, because both are rooted in the phenomenal 
field. The ego is certain not of its essence but only of its own existence. For this 
reason, in its role as recipient of appearing, the ego must be considered a formal 
structure without any content. According to Patočka, the ego is a “empty pro-
nominal structure”31; characters of appearance “stand before an empty I”32 who 
is the “one who realises [als Realisator] them”33. 
Patočka’s re-examination of the notion of subject eliminates the need to 
make it the ultimate foundation for appearance. But he argues that the subject 
still cannot be abandoned, since it is the basis for the concept of human re-
sponsability. This is a point still discussed in the philosophical debate: what do 
we make of the human subject? It is no longer considered a robust subject but 
one that discovers itself to be capable of corresponding to life, discovers itself as 
finite—open and in dialogue with the world. Patočka's move, then, reinstates the 
subject as the recipient of appearing: appearing “is always for a subject”34. Yet, 
“reflection on the I must have an entirely different, essentially practical character 
and an origin in the originally practical essence of our life's context [Le-
benszusammenhanges]”35. Thematizing the action does not mean turning inward 
but rather turning outward, towards extreme externality. Thus the world as the 
a priori structure of appearing makes no sense without a recipient of what 
 
 
30  “But what belongs to the I cannot be grasped in itself and in an ‘absolute way’.” Ibidem, p. 32. 
31 J. Patočka, Vom Erscheinen als solchem. Texte aus dem Nachlaß, Freiburg/München, K. Alber 
Verlag, 2000, p. 129. 
32 Ibidem, p. 121. 
33 J. Patočka, Husserl's Subjectivism and the Call for an Asubjective Phenomenology, p. 32. 
34 J. Patočka, Papiers phénoménologiques, Grenoble, Millon, 1995, p. 261. 
35 J. Patočka, Husserl's Subjectivism and the Call for an Asubjective Phenomenology, p. 38. 
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appears, namely without human beings, but the circumstance that appearing 
appears to someone, assigns “a role”36 to the subject in the act of manifestation. 
The subject, thus, does not determine the objective nature of what appears: it 
does not found the nature but it realizes it in practical life. 
Thus to clarify the nature of being in Patočka we need to start with appearing 
and with the phenomena in the field of appearance. The appearance of the sub-
ject manifests a general structure of appearing upon which the subject also de-
pends. According to Patočka, the necessity of the reduction to immanence and of 
the constitution of the object clarifies what is given but it calls for a metaphysical 
theory, one that has already decided what the sense of Being of being is, while 
in fact our intuition is incapable of explaining how lived experience can make 
transcendence appear objectively. In reference to the relationship between re-
duction and givenness, Bertrand Bouckaert thinks that “the problem of motiva-
tion for the reduction [to immanence] has had a decisive role in the genesis of 
asubjective phenomenology”37. In other words, Patočka realizes during his dis-
cussion of the ego that subjectivity cannot be considered the grounds for appear-
ing. All of our experiencing occurs in relation to a subject, but the subject cannot 
be the origin of the sense, because the subject itself is also dependent on ap-
pearing. Husserl, conversely, arrived at givenness through eidetic categorical in-
tuition: the phenomenal material, which is already structured, shows us a cate-
gorization, but this intuition necessitates a shift in the cogito so that “the self-
certainty of the existence of the ego, of the sum, was interpreted as a presence; 
and this presence was understood as original self-givenness. But original self-
givenness needs a corresponding object”38. On the other hand, according to 
Patočka, the conscience has to be redefined: “I is only experienced as the organ-
isational centre of a universal structure of appearance that cannot be reduced to 
a being as such, appearing in its particularity [Einzelsein]. We call this structure 
‘world’ […]”39. 
 
3.2 Transcendence and the phenomenal field 
 
 
36 J. Patočka, Vom Erscheinen als solchem, p. 120. 
37 Bertrand Bouckaert, “De l'autre côté du miroir: les motifs phénomenologiques de la réduction chez 
Husserl, Fink et Patočka”, Recherches Husserliennes 17 (2002), p. 106. 
38 J. Patočka, Husserl's Subjectivism and the Call for an Asubjective Phenomenology, pp. 35-36. 
39 J. Patočka, “Epochē and Reduction: Some Observations”, in Asubjective Phenomenology, p. 49. 
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According to Patočka givenness remains external to us: it appears to us with 
objective characters of appearance and with thetic characters of appearance, but 
these “are in no way present as a lived-experience or something subjective”40. 
For this reason Patočka says: 
 
That on the basis of which an object appears is itself objectively [sachlich] and not 
subjectively present. What Husserl brought into play, to oppose Natorp, i.e., the ‘lived-
experience’ [das ‘Erlebte’], is not at all given. And it violates the ‘principle of principles’ 
(namely, that the ultimate court of appeals to which one can take recourse in matters 
of knowledge is the given, but only insofar as it is actually given) if Husserl in the 
analysis of appearing appeals to an alleged basis of lived-experience that is simply not 
given.41 
 
As Ivan Chvatík has written, Patočka’s “refusal of the absolute ground of 
consciousness entails the abolition of the difference between the transcendence 
of mundane things and the immanence of the lived experiences of consciousness. 
It becomes apparent that the world […] is rather a special a priori horizon-struc-
ture by means of which anything can appear to us, precisely in our lived experi-
ences”42. For Patočka, therefore, “what appears originally are things and thingly 
characteristics, which appear [...] ‘over against me [mir gegenüber]’”43, such 
that “the ‘subjective’ quality of thetic characteristics and characteristics of 
givenness is precisely ‘out there’ (before me) like appearing things them-
selves”44. Referring to Iso Kern’s essay, Husserl und Kant (in which he designates 
noetic intentionality as constructive), Patočka maintains that the act of under-
standing as such does not give us the thing because the givenness of the thing 
is the construction of a way of being. The thing is understood by means of differ-
ent perspectives of it, which originate in the phenomeal field. Therefore, there 
can ultimately be no intuition of data. Only by dividing the phenomenal sphere 
into two moments—which means “[...] on the one hand what appears in his man-
ner of givenness, on the other hand the so-called subjective grounds of this 
 
 
40 J. Patočka, Husserl's Subjectivism and the Call for an Asubjective Phenomenology, p. 30. 
41 Idem. 
42 Ivan Chvatík, “Patočka’s Project of an Asubjective Phenomenology”, in Asubjective Phenomenol-
ogy, p. 62. 
43 J. Patočka, Husserl's Subjectivism and the Call for an Asubjective Phenomenology, p. 30. 
44 Ibidem, 31. 
EL PROBLEMA DE LA DONACIÓN EN LA REFLEXIÓN DE JAN PATOČKA 29 
  
Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, n. 16, 2019 29 
 
appearing [...]”45—would allow us the data intuition. Patočka overcame this split 
of the phenomenal sphere (but the appearing remains anyway unified) by re-
nouncing the subjective construction of the cogitationes. This is why the theme 
of asubjectivity arises. Even when, by acts of thought, we aim at an object (think-
ing its characters of givenness or its positional characters), we do not aim at 
something subjective (a real experience) that belongs to us, but rather at the 
phenomenal sphere in which we live and inside of which we orient ourselves46. 
At the same time, the phenomenal sphere does not have the same problematic 
character as the object that shows itself; the phenomenal sphere to many differ-
ent experiences which would become an endless process of confirmation. Though 
we need more ‘clarity’ on what the object means and how its prerequisite and 
foundation are to be sought in the subject. Patočka makes evident that the phe-
nomenal sphere cannot be interpreted as a mere subjective reflection, otherwise 
that reflection “will have the character of an original apprehension of the subjec-
tive being, does not in this regard in the same way the real objective being: [the 
subjective being] ‘does not adumbrate self’, but simply shows itself for what it 
is” 47. On this point Bruce Bégout remarks that, “with rare insight, Patočka 
glimpses very well where, in Husserl, the phenomenological primacy of internal 
perception, of evidence, is connected to the epistemological primacy of the tran-
scendental subject, in order to arrange phenomenological philosophy as the foun-
dation of all sciences”48. Considering Husserl's reading made by Patočka, what 
status does givenness have? Ultimately we do not know, because we are not able 
to determine it. Patočka finds the act of consciousness unable to directly disclose 
the given, either through internal perception or acts of reflection. 
Husserl's texts, however, are more ambiguous on this point: they offer other 
possible interpretations and openings. For example, § 50 of the Crisis testifies 
that “Husserl has managed to fully understand the situation of subjective phe-
nomenology”49. Iso Kern50 has likewise shown that in this paragraph of the Crisis, 
 
 
45 J. Patočka, Die Bewegung der menschlichen Existenz, p. 278. 
46 Patočka shows that he wants to continue the search in Fifth research and Sixth research of Logical 
Investigations. 
47 J. Patočka, Die Bewegung der menschlichen Existenz, p. 278. 
48 B. Bégout, “La phénoménologie décapitée? Perspectives et difficultés de la phénoménologie asub-
jective de Jan Patočka”, Chiasmi International 4 (2002), p. 381. 
49 Ibidem, p. 382. 
50   Iso Kern, Husserl und Kant. Eine Untersuchung über Husserls Verhältnis zu Kant und zum 
Neukantianismus, La Haye, M. Nijhoff, 1964, p. 361. 
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Husserl grasps the subjective (element) in the moment of its original openness 
and mobility—and thus not in its subsequent objective form as a noesis graspable 
via the reflective gaze. These readings suggest that the relation between subject 
and phenomenal plan should be thought in a new way. Thus, according to 
Patocka, “no ‘data-animating intention’ can be grasped, exhibited, or given”51, 
and the appearing of the thing is still given to me in the phenomenal field. Start-
ing from the phenomenal field—which means, starting from phenomena them-
selves—we have to interprete the subjective and the things these make appear. 
Even the “egological” must be grasped in the phenomenal field, because it is a 
constitutive part of that field: it arises there along with the things it makes ap-
pear. To understand this point, it is important to differentiate between “subjec-
tive” (subjektivní) and “subjectual” (subjektní). The “subjective” indicates that to 
which the subject relates as the horizon of its understanding, while “subjectual” 
indicates the “egological”. In this second sense the world is subjective and is the 
epoché that gives access to the subjectual dimension. To understand what is 
given, we therefore must take into account the relationship between the subject, 
the phenomenal field, and the structure of the field of appearance. In reference 
to the relationship between subject and phenomenal field, Patočka writes: 
 
The fundamental law of appearing is that there is always the duality between that 
which appears and that to which this appearing being appears; appearing is such only 
in this duality, but in no way that to which the appearing being appears creates the 
appearance, effectuates it, “constitute” it, produces it in some way. On the contrary, 
appearing is not appearing other than in this duality.52 
 
Thus, for Patočka the field of appearing has both an empirical and a tran-
scendental side. For this reason we must always distinguish the legality that gov-
erns the structure of things from that which regulates the structure of appearing, 
but these two aspects are linked together because the phenomenic laws of ap-
pearing are also given in beings53. The plane of appearing has a preliminary, 
trascendental meaning (indicating the world of appearing, the whole) and an 
empirical meaning that presupposes this universal structure. Every singularity 
 
 
51 J. Patočka, Husserl's Subjectivism and the Call for an Asubjective Phenomenology, p. 32. 
52 J. Patočka, Papiers phénoménologiques, p. 127. 
53 This intertwining of the laws of appearing seems to recall the chiasm of Merleau-Ponty. 
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comes from this structural whole. It is not possible to understand the whole start-
ing only with sensory impressions and representations, because every being is a 
possibility emerging within the whole. The sphere of appearing, from this per-
spective, must have an autonomous structure. According to the Czech philoso-
pher not having thought it in this way led Husserl to posit a split between the 
subjective sphere and the objective sphere of givenness. 
What would this autonomy that Patočka locates mean? It does not mean that 
the phenomenal field has an autonomous Being (Eigenes Sein) in the sense of 
“an absolutely self-contained being [Seiendes]”54. Appearance as such, indeed, 
has no independent reality; it is simply the world of the possible55. In order not 
to be based on the subject, the phenomenal field has an autonomy (Eingenstän-
digkeit) from the subject that must be maintained. The function of this autonomy 
field is “to make appear another thing”56 and it means independence from any 
reference to consciousness: the phenomenal field is the place “where the being 
of egological and noegological nature shows itself for what it is, where both kinds 
of beings can meet”57. The plane of appearance, therefore, is independent of the 
subject but not in an absolute sense. The being appearing in the plane of appear-
ance is related to the subject to which it appears, but this correlation is sui gen-
eris: it is ‘between’ the two, a means, something mediating. “For this the ‘given’ 
- upon which the appearance always depends - must always remain in it [in the 
being] as its non-thematic foundation; the given is what interrogates me”58. 
What then indicates the existence of an ‘object’? First of all my fulfillment of 
it, but also its probable being. There is present in the phenomenal field not only 
an object but also an area, a horizon, an originality and its relapse back into non-
originality59. Therefore, on one hand, the subject is not independent from the 
Being of the field of appearance, because it is located in it; on the other hand, 
the phenomenal sphere cannot be interpreted as a mere subjective reflection. 
Patočka establishes the independence of the phenomenal field of appearing of 
consciousness on a different ground from that of consciousness, since the sub-
jectivity of the phenomenal field means only that the world appears, that the 
 
 
54 J. Patočka, Husserl's Subjectivism and the Call for an Asubjective Phenomenology, p. 33. 
55  See J. Patočka, Papiers phénoménologiques, p. 126. 
56 Ibidem, p. 128. 
57 J. Patočka, Die Bewegung der menschlichen Existenz, p. 280. 
58 J. Patočka, Papiers phénoménologiques, p. 128. 
59  See Idem. 
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characters of appearance materially express the understanding of things, their 
Being and their essence. “We can designate the field of appearance also as ‘sub-
jectivity’, but we have to recognize that this ‘subjectivity’ is an understanding in 
the form of understood [...]”60. This means subjectivity that understands is in-
cluded in the field of appearance and can be clarified only within the world. 
This is why Patočka does not see the reduction to immanence as a solution 
to the problem of appearing and to the problem of givenness. Instead, he main-
tains that: 
 
A study of the phenomenal field—a study of appearance in its appearing—would have 
to be established. This would be a study of the nature of phenomenal being [des 
phänomenalen Seins], which consists in revealing beings [Seiendes], enabling them to 
appear; and which, in this appearing of beings [des Seienden] does not itself become 
a theme, hiding itself, so to speak, in the appearing of things.61 
 
The field of appearance is thus not constituted by subjectivity, and we cannot 
explain it starting from subjectivity, because it is not correlated to subjectivity62. 
The field of appearance should not be understood as the noematic sphere: it is 
not composed by subjective processes, “animating” intentions, apprehensions, 
or lived experiences. Rather, the ultimate foundation of the field of appearance 
lies in what goes beyond the subject. For these reasons, Patočka qualifies the 
phenomenal sphere as asubjective and the ego as opening itself “towards more 
fundamental structures which found experience”63. “There is a phenomenal field, 
a being [ein Sein] of the phenomenon as such, which cannot be traced back to 
anything existent which appears in it”64. Therefore, we cannot know whether a 
being that appears is objective or if it has a subjective-egological nature; we 
specify it only on the basis of appearing and of the appearance of the phenomenal 
field. The appearing of the subject thus always refers to a general structure of 
appearing. Based on the analyzes presented so far, the problem of the 
 
 
60 J. Patočka, Vom Erscheinen als solchem, p. 146. 
61 J. Patočka, Husserl's Subjectivism and the Call for an Asubjective Phenomenology, pp. 32-33. 
62 See J. Patočka, Papiers phénoménologiques, p. 129. 
63 J. Patočka, Die Bewegung der menschlichen Existenz, p. 284. 
64 J. Patočka, Husserl's Subjectivism and the Call for an Asubjective Phenomenology, p. 33. 
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constitution of objectivity “is unsolvable as a whole”65, but this does not exclude 
the possibility of understanding what structure. What is this structure that ap-
pears? 
 
We consider belonging to the structure of appearing as such this universal totality of 
apparent being, the great whole, as well as that to which the apparent being appears, 
subjectivity (which has an empty pronominal structure, a structure that cannot be 
identified with a single closed subject); and the how of appearing, to which the polarity 
of fulfillment-emptying belongs (never intending this as an absolute void, a nothing-
ness).66 
 
The elements composing the field of appearance are therefore three: the 
universal whole of appearing beings, that to which the appearing being appears, 
and the mode (the how) of appearing. The structure of the field of appearance 
cannot be described as an object but must be “investigated in itself without sup-
posing anything else”67. The difficulty Patočka runs into is that, as Husserl had 
already understood, on one hand the subjective pole runs the risk of radically 
changing the meaning of problems68 and of missing the pure phenomenon; on 
the other hand, the relation between the living and dynamic subject and the 
world is not erased but must be reconsidered. If appearing “is an original phe-
nomenon, something original”69 in itself, we cannot refer to the being to clarify 
appearing in its appearing, because any thesis concerning being already presup-
poses an understanding of appearing.  
In order to clarify what the givenness is, it is important to stress that the 
structure of appearing, however, does not depend on the subject, but it does 
influence the way the world gives itself70. The phenomenal plane, therefore, must 
 
 
65 See J. Patočka, Die Bewegung der menschlichen Existenz, p. 280. 
66 J. Patočka, Vom Erscheinen als solchem, p. 129. 
67 Ibidem, p. 264. 
68  See E. Husserl, Die Krisis der europaïschen Wissenchaffen und die transzendentale 
Phänomenologie. Eine Ein-leitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie, Den Haag, M. Nijhoff, 1954. Eng-
lish Translation: Id., The Crisis of European Sciences and Trascendental Phenomenology, Evanston, North-
western University Press, 1970, § 48. 
69 J. Patočka, Vom Erscheinen als solchem, p. 113. A phrase quoted in a note of the German edition 
of the manuscript, and then deleted, is important, “the world is not a whole, but Being itself, and Being is 
at the same time the whole of being and of appearance” Idem (this phrase does not appear in the French 
translation). This refers to the primacy of phenomenology over ontology. 
70 This distinction is important because “the whole concept of specific and special world, as for ex-
ample that of a cosmology in a physical sense, already presupposes the laws and the prior structure of 
appearing.” J. Patočka, Vom Erscheinen als solchem, p. 129. 
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be understood as grounds for development of an autonomous motivation of 
sense71: the plane is wider than being, because it “is a project of any possible 
meeting with the being”72. Appearing primarily means appearing in the world. 
The laws and internal coherence that govern this plane of appearing are con-
nected to two factors: to the givenness of the whole and to the continuabilty of 
experience. These laws are a structure that the I, the ‘subject’ must necessarily 
understand; without them, “the subject would not be able to exist in clarity about 
itself and about things”73. The most important phenomenological issues are de-
cided by the appearing field and its conformance with these laws, including the 
sense of givenness.  
 
3.3 From the given to the world as given 
 
Let us now delve into how the world gives itself as phenomenon. Explaining 
how we perceive the world remains a problem for Patočka because, on one hand, 
he takes the world as a whole as a precondition, and on the other hand, we only 
ever see individual things, not the whole as such. So, there must be something 
within experience that makes possible its continuability so that “his horizon is 
given simultaneously to the thing, and step by step, all horizons, that is, the 
world, which appears here as a concrete figure of the continuability of experi-
ence”74. In this regard, Patočka writes: 
 
That the rear side of this table is not present in person, does not mean that there is 
no-present-in-person the fact that the table necessarily has a rear side as a physical 
object. The same is true for the apprehension of space—the fact that space is always 
only given from one point of view does not mean that it is not given in its own way 
and does not negate the fact that each of these points of view, with the fraction of 




71 See J. Patočka, Papiers phénoménologiques, p. 124. 
72 J. Patočka, Die Bewegung der menschlichen Existenz, p. 282. 
73 Ibidem, p. 274. 
74 Renaud Barbaras, L’ouverture du monde. Lecture de Jan Patočka, Chatou, Les Éditions de la trans-
parence, 2011, p. 66. 
75 J. Patočka, Vom Erscheinen als solchem, p. 131. 
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The continuability of experience is given in advance, but it is not a potentiality 
originating from the consciousness. The subject only discovers one side of beings 
at a time, but it participates in the manner in which appearing structures every 
appearance in the world. According to Patočka, the course of sketches presup-
poses the continuability of experience because the sketches can also not confirm 
my anticipations. Hence, what allows the development of experience is the 
framework or background presumed of the world. This framework has to already 
exist to ensure that the object is formed—which presupposes a plane where ex-
ists a deeper level than intuition. 
The assumption of this other plane is not given by the intuition but by an 
independent presence, because it is a law of the phenomenal field that does not 
depend on contingent. For Patočka, talking about our experiencing of the world 
implies that the world itself becomes a phenomenon or, rather, that experiencing 
examines the phenomenon of the world. Experience of the world is different from 
all other types of experience: it is the original that precedes and makes possible 
all other experiences. But what conception of experience allows Patočka to say 
this? He understands experience not in the ordinary sense, but as experience as 
such76. For Patočka the world we experience is not the sum of its beings but the 
totality of its possibilities. It's not me giving myself possibilities but the world 
giving them to me: “they come to me from the outside, from the world”77. The 
world as a whole, then, is understood as a principle of unity that articulates finite 
beings. If we adopt this different idea of the world, it is also necessary rethink 
subjectivity, because the notion of world is crucial to how we understand the 
structure of human existence. The question then becomes whether the world in 
Patočka is a simple phenomenon or whether it is phenomenality itself.  
A paradoxical thesis in Plato and Europe could help us clarify this difficulty. 
Patočka claims that “the same appears to us in various ways of givenness”78. But 
how can the world be given as a whole and by subjective perspectives? Are the 
two different modes of giving the world compatible? Yes, according to Patočka. 
In fact he states: “The world is given to us in its entirety, but this does not mean 
that it is not given to us perspectivally, that it is given to us in its full 
 
 
76 That is possible by an epoché without reduction. 
77 J. Patočka, Vom Erscheinen als solchem, p. 90. 
78 J. Patočka, Platón a Evropa, 1979, in SS-2/PD-II. English Translation: Id., Plato and Europe, Stan-
ford, Stanford University Press, 2002, p. 24. 
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completeness”79. There are, therefore, two kinds of givenness: a givenness ac-
cording to the whole and a givenness in accordance with perspectives. But they 
are two sides of the same givenness. In the appearing of a thing, always a whole 
shows itself, but this whole implies an excess of givenness which means a retreat 
compared to what shows itself to the subject. The given, therefore, can only show 
itself partially, that is, through perspectives. Everything that shows itself is given, 
but not all that gives itself also shows itself. For this reason Patočka often says 
that “[...] the one within many ways of showing always has to show itself to us, 
in various manners of givenness, from many sides”80. The question that underlies 
this statement is: “Where does this unity throughout the different ways of show-
ing, throughout the different ways of how things show themselves to us?”81 Com-
ing out of the world from the original manifestation means the phenomenon re-
mains identical to itself throughout this process. But how can there be two 
phases, compatible with each other, of the same givenness: one ‘as a whole’ and 
another ‘according to perspectives’? According to the Czech philosopher “what 
reveals itself in its completeness is not the whole; these are just individualities, 
changeable details, varying with our movements, the diversity of perspectives”82. 
In this way, like the concept of the world, immediate givenness also yet con-
tains a paradoxical element: it is a givenness as a whole but always according to 
perspectives. Yet a difference between world and givenness nonetheless 
emerges: givenness occurs in totality with respect to the world, but according to 
perspectives in reference to the subject. Therefore a divergence between 
givenness (from the point of view of the phenomenon that gives itself) and the 
appearance (from the point of view of the subject that receives the givenness) 
must exist. The given shows itself according to perspectives, and thus partially, 
but showing itself according to perspectives does not mean giving itself partially. 
On the contrary, while something appears to us, it is always given to us as a 
whole. The givenness of the world is always given in totality, but it is not imme-
diate. Therefore, assuming that givenness according to perspectives implies that 
the world is given with an excess of givenness compared to the partiality of 
 
 
79 Ibidem, p. 72. 
80 Ibidem, p. 133. 
81 Ibidem, p. 22. 
82 Ibidem, p. 73. 
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perspectives: “The world as a whole is then anticipated and involved in every 
perception”83. For this reason Patočka can claim: 
 
[…] here in front of me there is a lot more than what perception presents us and shows 
us. The perception of singularity is always already known within an infinite, realizable 
inactuality. Therefore perception does not occur among the givennesses of always new 
perceptions, but from the start already takes place within a totality that is here, even 
if it is not perceived; and it is precisely this totality that, in perception, is articulated in 
a given part and in a not-given part, in presence and non-presence, actual and non-
actual, familiar and foreign.84 
 
The phenomenological concept of world, thus, takes on a paradox of satura-
tion: we can speak of the world as a saturated phenomenon85. The concept of 
‘saturated phenomenon’ is used to indicate this excess of givenness, which as-
sumes the shape of a lack, of a retreat. In this sense Patočka can say that emp-
tiness “is not a non-givenness but a way of giving”86, an excess compared to the 
ability of the concept to understand what is given. Therefore rather than fully 
grasping the given, the phenomenon always remains irreducible.  
Nevertheless this theoretical position poses a question: should we describe 
the world as phenomenon, or is the world phenomenality itself? While Patočka 
may not give us a final answer, he does make it clear that the horizon and totality 
of the world should be thought of as something that “we can never convert to an 
objective insight”87—nor can we doubt them, because any explicit belief in Being 
presupposes implicit belief in the whole. Let's examine more in detail how the 
givenness of the world is conceived by Patočka. The world is the unity of what 
we experience, but it cannot be thought of as an object, because it is not before 
us in the way an object is: it instead “contains everything and it is in everything 
 
 
83 J. Patočka, Qu'est-ce que la phénoménologie?, Grenoble, Millon, 2002, p. 145. 
84 J. Patočka, Le monde naturel et le mouvement de l'existence humaine, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1988, p. 27. 
85 Jean Luc Marion organizes this phenomenality around the concepts of phenomenon and of satu-
rated givenness (see J.-L. Marion, Étant donné. Essai d'une phénoménologie de la donation, Paris, PUF, 
1997, p. 429). Everything that is given is not necessarily given in the conceptualizing capacity of the 
subject. Renaud Barbaras also speaks of a “primitive given” to indicate this diversity of original appearing 
(see R. Barbaras, Le mouvement de l'existence: études sur la phénoménologie de Jan Patočka, Chatou, 
Les Éditions de la transparence, 2007, p. 19). For Patočka, the fact that there are limits to the world’s 
showing itself to us means that the subject is limited in his capacity to receive givenness in totality. 
86 J. Patočka, Vom Erscheinen als solchem, p. 129. 
87 J. Patočka, Le monde naturel et le mouvement de l'existence humaine, p. 46. 
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and in all things”88. The world cannot even be represented by a subject, because 
“‘every representing [Vorstellende] subject’ is not in front of the world, but is 
contained in it”89. “And the person who mirrors the world cannot be distinct from 
it as if he were ‘on the other side’, as something ‘transcendent’”90. The world 
reflects itself and at the same time is embracing itself and producing its own 
mirror, “being this mirror”91. The world influences our experience, but “it is never 
objectively experienced; but rather is at work in the experience as a non-thematic 
horizon”92. Since we always experience individual things, the term horizon would 
seem to indicate an improper mode of givenness; yet for Patočka, the horizon 
instead indicates “the promise of something intuitive, concrete and, in this sense, 
always individual”93. The world is therefore not itself a horizon, an improper mode 
of givenness, but is “the omnitudo realitatis in an authoritative sense”94. 
Patočka wants to give the world an ontological certainty that cannot be ques-
tioned and, for this reason, he calls it “unfalsifiable noema”95. The world produces 
a unity not present in the unique being if this is understood as something objec-
tive. Therefore, even if we never really experience the world, “we have to think 
of it as the unity of all”,96 because the whole is 
 
The preliminary framework, total, un-individuated, for all individuation. Undivided, it 
separates and unites all; it is a whole that is not composed of parts, that is incommen-
surable with each part, a whole that is contained entirely in each part. The world is not 
a being, and it can be thematized only in relationships that the objects within it offer.97 
 
The world is not a sum of objects, but a great backdrop influencing the pos-
sibility of the constitution of objects, i.e.: the non-objective, presupposed ground 
that serves as the condition for their perceptibility; untotalizable totality. Every 
appearance presupposes the unity of the world and has as its form (or a priori) 
the open totality of what may appear. Patočka explains in manner the way world 
 
 
88 J. Patočka, Vom Erscheinen als solchem, p. 106, n. 165. 
89 Ibidem, p. 106. 




94 Ibidem, p. 106. n. 165. 
95 J. Patočka, Papiers phénoménologiques, p. 267. 
96 Ibidem, p. 216. 
97 J. Patočka, Le monde naturel et le mouvement de l'existence humaine, p. 100. 
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given, and how we can understand it. On the contrary, for Husserl, desire to 
clarify the givenness of the world was a obstacle to understanding its structure98. 
The door giving access to the appearing of the world is the epoché. Study of 
appeareance as such means studying what appears within the framework of this 
whole. To clarify the problem of givenness in Patočka it is necessary therefore 
turn to the problem of appearing. 
 
4. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Investigating givenness in Patočka, it becomes clear that the philosopher 
uses the concept to contemplate both givenness and phenomenality. A formal 
concept of phenomenon remains an open question in his work. His claim that it 
is possible for one thing to show itself in different perspectives is not a thesis but 
a problem that remains to be solved—just like the problem of how the identity of 
a thing can be maintained when it is given in this way. And this applies not only 
to the world but also to the I, because even the I is never fully given. How then 
can we clarify the phenomenality (or the self-giving) of the phenomenon? 
Patočka argues that only by observing the phenomenon as such can we find the 
unity underneath its various modes of givenness: “Through determining how var-
ious manners of givenness are connected—through precisely this do I get the 
structure of the phenomenon as such. Of course, at the same time we naturally 
have to ask further: What allows for various manners of givenness at all, and 
upon what do they depend?”99. 
The reasoning developed so far has not let us solve the internal difficulties of 
the issue of givenness; instead it leds us to a new starting question, i.e.: can the 
phenomenal appear in the world? Therefore, even the question about what is 
given must be reformulated because no data exist, but only a network of cross-
references and external references to the subject. The world consitutes the high-
est number of original possibilities, an a priori field which must be assumed, but 
it remains a “mystery”100. It is not by chance that Patočka discusses the grounds 
of manifestation by means of two eloquent metaphors: the mirror and painting. 
 
 
98  See J. Patočka, Liberté et sacrifice, Grenoble, Millon, 1990, p. 194. 
99 J. Patočka, Plato and Europe, p. 29. 
100 Patočka says in Plato and Europe: “We cannot freely just dispose of what shows itself in the 
original, nor of what shows itself not-originally, what shows itself only in a derivative form. In a certain 
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A mirror reflects everything except itself, or it reflects itself only by reflecting 
its image as reflected in another mirror. The reflected image is for this reason 
always poorer than the reality that the mirror reflects.101 
Appearing—something in something; that which withdraws before what is 
shown in it—such as painting to the panel […] 
Painting is something that can itself appear, manifest, but what makes the 
appearing originally possible does not manifest itself; it is always already over-
taken in the direction of the apparent being—of what is present in the original 
(or in a non-original mode)—because we are the presence of other things, as well 
as of ourselves, within the whole; we are = we realize (in us is realized) the 
presence of all these things. 
We ourselves do not manifest originally. We do not appear, because we are 
what withdraws to make way for the presence of things—even the soul does not 
manifest itself, because it itself makes everything appear—the soul, we cannot 
decipher it, thanks to the interpretation of the being that appears.102 
Patočka affirms “that the world shows itself is of course the most important, 
the most profound fact and problem with which philosophy operates, and in wich 
it operates”103. In this sense, I would argue that a question remains unanswered: 
can the appearance be subject to rigorous analysis and real knowledge? Patočka 
addresses this topic only marginally. 
Secondly we must say that experience is always experience with or of some-
thing. As Ivan Chvatík writes: “To ask ‘what is experience?’ is thus to ask how 
things are given, how they manifest themselves to us”104. Developing this prob-
lem Patočka reminds us that everything is related, everything is intertwined, and 
that all ‘things’ are opened and relational. To ask ‘what is the sense of Being of 
the world that manifests itself’ in Patočka therefore relates to our world experi-
ence and has important consequences—consequences that are still insufficiently 
investigated. It also seems to refer to these observations what Guido Davide Neri 
says, that is every manifestation of deep blindness in modernity with regard to 
 
 
sense, we know how the reality that is not actually before us would appear to us, and as a result we know 
that solely experience of a certain kind could be in agreement with what actually is showing itself to us” 
Ibidem, p. 20. 
101 J. Patočka, Vom Erscheinen als solchem, p. 109. 
102 Ibidem, pp. 266-267. 
103 J. Patočka, Plato and Europe, p. 175. 
104 I. Chvatík, Patočka’s Project of an Asubjective Phenomenology, p. 59. 
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the structure of human existence is manifested “as a ‘loss of the world’”105. If 
this is true, the task of phenomenology—that is, our study of appearance, man-
ifestation, or phenomenon—acquires a great importance that moves beyond the 
theoretical, for it addresses the consciousness with which we live in the world. 
 
 
105 Guido Davide Neri, “L'Europa dal fondo del suo declino”, in Id., Il sensibile, la storia e l'arte: scritti 
1957-2001, Verona, Ombre Corte, 2003, p. 282. 
